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Millions of China’s Uyghur Muslims yet again banned from observing Ramadan as restaurants forced to remain open

30 May 2017943

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Read original article on Radio Free Asia or read a quick summary below;

  1.  “Authorities in northwest China are implementing a set of “stability maintenance” measures in Xinjiang during Ramadan, but sources say restaurants have been ordered to stay open throughout the Islamic sacred month as part of the directive, suggesting efforts to undermine the Muslim tradition of fasting.”
  2.  “A Han Chinese official with the Zawa township government in Qaraqash said that his office had been ordered by county officials to keep restaurants “open as usual … especially during the Ramadan period”  saying, “If anybody fails to comply with this order, they will be dealt with, and while I’m not sure of the specific punishment, [the restaurants] should be open no matter what.”
  3.  “The order to keep restaurants open during Ramadan does not appear to have been extended to other Muslim minorities living in China. An ethnic Hui Muslim restaurant owner in Ningxia Autonomous Region’s capital Yinchuan said he would be closing his business for Ramadan, much like he does every year.”
  4.  “Officials in Hotan city also ordered restaurants and stores selling food and drink to remain open during fasting hours, with fines imposed on owners who failed to comply.”
  5. “According to the Zawa official, teachers, public servants and employees in the service sector are “not allowed to fast” during Ramadan. Schoolchildren were also barred from religious observance, while at least one Uyghur studying at Kashgar University in Kashgar prefecture said administrators at his school “regularly check each classroom and force Uyghur students to drink water or eat something in front of them.”
#china#china-islamophobia#fast#fasting#hotan#hui#islamophobia#ramadan#restaurants#uygur#xinjiang

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